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Hagan: Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers

specialized and foreign terms used in the
book, at exactly the right level of detail.
In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain
is a unique and valuable contribution to
the study of unconventional warfare. In
view of the ongoing U.S. operations in
Afghanistan, the editors would be performing a civic service were they to
produce a revised and reedited version
for general publication.
WILLIAM C. GREEN

Department of Political Science
CSU San Bernardino

Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam
and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Penguin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95

For Americans who were adults during
the Vietnam War, the name Daniel
Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests
a whiff of treason or connotes heroic
patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps
veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior
official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, a highly regarded analyst for
the RAND Corporation, and a civilian
observer of platoon-level combat in
Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk
point” with the troops he was observing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to
the New York Times a seven-thousandpage, highly classified Department of
Defense history of American involvement in Vietnam. Covering the war
from the Truman administration
through the Tet offensive of early 1968,
this study became known as “The Pentagon Papers” when the New York
Times began publishing it on 13 June.
Ellsberg’s action earned him federal felony indictments and a protracted criminal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge
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abruptly dismissed the government’s
case, because in the last few weeks evidence had materialized showing that
agents of the Richard M. Nixon administration had denied Ellsberg his right
to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychiatrist’s office in search of material with
which to blackmail him into not releasing more documents. This revelation
became part of the unfolding drama of
the Watergate scandal, the surreptitious
forced nighttime entry into the Democratic Party headquarters by the same
agents of the administration. President
Nixon attempted to buy the silence of
one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt,
with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar
bribe. Facing impeachment for attempting to cover up the break-in,
Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The
sonofabitching thief is made a national
hero. . . . And the New York Times gets a
Pulitzer for stealing documents.”
Secrets is a book that must be read by
anyone seeking to understand how the
United States formulates its strategy
and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the
“quagmire” thesis favored by such influential liberal interpreters as Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation,
beginning with Harry S. Truman up to
the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,
each president made a deeper commitment of American military power and
clandestine activity, under the conviction that his actions would achieve a
South Vietnamese victory over the invaders from the communist North.
From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was
no quagmire, only endless presidential
deception of Congress and the public,
who were led to believe decade after decade that surely the next step would result in the successful establishment of a
permanently independent South
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Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action
officer for Vietnam, reporting personally to John McNaughton, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara’s principal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg became convinced that every president
knew that his commitments would
prove insufficient to accomplish the
goal of preserving South Vietnam’s independence. However, none of them
could withdraw American support—
because a communist victory in South
Vietnam would create an unbearable
political liability in the Cold War climate
of “wars of national liberation” backed
by the Soviets and China.
Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s
aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964.
On that day his office was receiving
live reports of North Vietnamese
patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. destroyer Maddox, the presence of which
off North Vietnam was one of several
provocations staged by the Johnson
administration to elicit a military reaction from Hanoi. The administration
publicly claimed that two distinct sets
of attacks were made, first on the
Maddox and a short time later on the
Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner
Joy. Drawing on his direct experience
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Maddox’s skipper raised doubts about the
second set of attacks within a few hours
of announcing them. The Johnson administration nonetheless went to Congress describing both attacks as bona
fide, because together they appeared to
justify a long-planned escalation of the
air war. Once armed by Congress with
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson
made a few direct retaliatory air strikes
and then posed as the presidential peace
candidate. He was running against
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Republican Barry Goldwater, who was
advocating precisely the kind of sustained air campaign that Johnson had
already planned and would begin once
safely reelected president.
One can applaud or condemn Daniel
Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What
one cannot do is ignore the power his
memoir has to inform Americans about
how the executive branch conducted its
foreign policy and military strategy
from the 1940s until 1974. As the
United States apparently heads (at this
writing) toward another major war, the
skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at
the top have really changed.
KEN HAGAN

Professor of Strategy
Naval War College—Monterey, California

Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and
Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50

The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the opening of major Russian archives
have provided an opportunity to add
greatly to our understanding of the
character of the Soviet navy. Eminent
researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail
S. Monakov have contributed much to
this understanding with their study of
Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy
when Josef Stalin controlled the development of the Soviet Navy, from 1935
until his death in 1953. They have uncovered extensive details of the massive
shipbuilding program, most of which
never came to fruition. Strategy, however, remains as murky as ever. This
study complements but does not replace Monakov’s series of articles on
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